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The ongoing significance of national media systems in the context of 
media globalization 
 
Comparative studies and media systems 
Cross-national comparative research in media studies has gained much needed attention 
in recent years (Esser and Hanitzsch 2012). This is a welcome development to correct 
two long-standing limitations in the field. First, it contributes to reducing the one-way 
traffic of academic ideas that has characterized the study of media, politics, and policies. 
Just like communication and media studies in general, the study of media politics and 
policies has been largely embedded in scholarship produced in the US and Britain, and 
central research questions in the field have reflected particular scholarly priorities and 
empirical developments in both countries. The problem of this geographical bias is that 
the media-politics-policy nexus in both countries has been unique. Consequently, the 
analytical scaffolding has largely reflected particular political-media settings. Against this 
backdrop, renewed interest in comparative research has sparked growing scholarly 
dialogue across borders and stimulated a cosmopolitan academic sensitivity interested in 
theoretical questions and cross-national processes (Waisbord 2014).  
 
Second, comparative research helps us to interrogate the relevance of country and 
regional studies in the context of global communication and media studies. The field of 
media politics has been ‘de-Westernized’ for a long time, if this means the availability of 
studies about, and produced in, non-Western settings. A significant limitation has, 
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however, been the propensity towards largely descriptive comparative studies primarily 
interested in understanding national differences, rather than developing alternative 
explanations and theories. Cross-national comparative work mitigates the limitations of 
parallel academic discussions by fostering interest in common theoretical and conceptual 
questions. It encourages scholars to be mindful of the significance of national/regional 
cases for a global academic community. Comparative research has renewed the debate 
about units of analysis of the study of media and politics. Recent comparative studies 
have examined such topics as media systems (Dobek-Ostrowska et al. 2010; Hallin and 
Mancini 2004, 2012; Thomass and Kleinstuber 2011), news coverage (Benson 2013), 
journalistic cultures and practice (Örnebring 2012), and the impact of media structures 
and content on citizens’ knowledge about public affairs (Aalberg and Curran 2012; Esser 
et al. 2012). There is also a growing comparative media policy literature, where the 
concept of comparative media governance is being drawn upon to move from simply 
listing institutional and regulatory differences between nations, towards the generation of 
‘causal comparisons [which] involve hypothesis testing in order to explain similarities 
and differences’ (Puppis and d’Haenens 2012: 214; c.f. Puppis 2010).    
 
Of particular relevance in this discussion is the significance, and the continuing 
relevance, of studying media systems bounded by nations and states (Livingstone 2012). 
The obvious question raised by globalization is that if it is the transformative process of 
our times, why should we study media systems mapped onto the boundaries of nations 
and states? As Jonathan Hardy observes, comparative media systems research grapples 
with ‘a tension between analysis of the cluster of features that have shaped and 
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differentiated media systems, organized largely on national lines, and the transnational 
and transcultural dynamics that are reshaping these systems’ (Hardy 2012: 185). There 
are those who argue that such approaches retain a state-centric ‘methodological 
nationalism’ that is inappropriate in an age of global communication networks, social 
processes and planetary risks (Beck and Sznaider 2006; Steger 2009). The related point is 
that media systems are seen as isolating the national scale, in a world where political, 
economic and cultural relations are increasingly multi-scalar, moving between the local 
(city-regions), the national, and the regional-transnational.  
 
The critique of ‘media systems’ as analytical units 
Three critiques have been leveled against focusing on ‘media systems’ as the unit of 
comparative research: that the concept is outdated and methodologically flawed; that it 
ties media cultures to nation-states in ways that are no longer appropriate; and that a 
‘system’ itself is not an analytical unit for comparative study.   
 
One criticism is that the notion of ‘media system’ is outdated and flawed, as both ‘media’ 
and ‘system’ are embedded in questionable premises about the analysis of social 
phenomena, rooted in normative and essentialist accounts such as the classic Four 
Theories of the Press (Seibert et al. 1956). The concept of ‘media’ assumes the mass 
communication context of discrete technologies and industries that provide separate 
‘channels’ which make possible the mass production and distribution of content. This 
conception is seen as passé in a convergent media order where digital technologies have 
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collapsed old divisions across media industries and formats, and lines between 
inter/personal and mass media are being fundamentally blurred if not completely erased. 
The concept of ‘media’ fails to acknowledge recent changes that put in question 
traditional ideas of channels that ‘mediate’ communication. The notion of ‘system’ is 
seen as a conceptual leftover of mid-century functionalist sociology that envisioned 
society as constituted by interdependent parts with distinct functions, as components 
articulated around a common center and purpose that shape and reinforce a closed and 
stable order. Alternative concepts such as ‘information/news ecology’ (Napoli 2011; 
Scolari 2012) and ‘media order’ (Chalaby 2005) have been suggested to displace the 
concept of ‘media systems’.  
 
A second critique is that the notion of ‘media system’ is mapped over the boundaries and 
power of nation-states (Couldry and Hepp 2009, 2012). The focus on ‘media systems’ 
tacitly assumes the primacy of nation-states, which is seen as a questionable premise at a 
time of increased trans-border cultural/media processes. This premise is at the root of a 
twofold problem. One is whether it downplays the extent to which media processes have 
become unmoored from media systems and nation-states, so that media systems and 
nation-states are no longer the primary sites of communication/media/culture. A related 
problem is the analytical ‘tunnel vision’ of ‘media systems’ studies.  By focusing on 
national media systems, they lose sight of phenomena that transcend the boundaries of 
nation-states. The intensification of diasporic and hybrid media cultures, as well as 
transnational activism and global digital/social media networks, challenge the media-
cultural sovereignty of modern nation-states. Moreover, global media production 
  
 
5
networks are focused on cities rather than nations: cities as diverse as Mumbai, 
Vancouver, Hong Kong, and Miami serve as ‘key nodes or “switching points” for flows 
of capital and labor’ (Punathambekar 2013: 11), with only a limited degree of articulation 
back into national media cultures.  
 
A third criticism is that ‘media systems’ are not appropriate analytical units, as they 
consist of component elements such as laws, politics, economics, cultures and institutions 
which should instead be the focus of scholarly inquiry. Humphreys (2011) has argued 
that the particular institutions that constitute media systems offer better explanatory 
variables for understanding of the differing relationship between media and politics 
across countries, as seen through empirical indicators such as types of news coverage, 
relations between governments and the media, or governmental communication 
strategies. Rather than discussing the constitutive elements of media systems through 
various typologies, it is proposed that we should focus on the characteristics of 
institutions (e.g. markets, political parties, laws, journalism) and inter-institutional 
relations. Because ‘media systems’ do not explain the nature and characteristics of 
particular political-communication phenomena, grounded empirical studies should 
instead focus upon these institutional structures and dynamics to explain differences and 
similarities.  
 
This line of argument is supported by recent comparative studies that explain differences 
across countries by focusing on specific characteristics of media systems. For example, 
different relations between journalism and politics (Esser and Umbricht 2013; Benson 
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and Hallin 2007) explain variations in news coverage, type of media source (public vs. 
private) account for disparities in citizens’ knowledge about public affairs in European 
countries and journalists’ occupational values and newsroom norms explain different 
journalistic practices across countries (Aalberg and Curran 2012). These conclusions may 
suggest that specific institutions and practices within national media, rather than media 
systems as an aggregating category, best explain similarities and differences across 
countries.  
 
Our intention in this paper is to offer a qualified defense for why the concept of ‘media 
systems’ remains a relevant and useful analytical unit for comparative media studies and 
media policy studies, even if we acknowledge the critique of functionalism, the 
importance of globalization, and the specificities of particular institutional forms and 
grounded professional media practice. The concept of ‘media systems’ is a conceptual 
construction that enables an aggregation of structures and dynamics in ways that allow 
for the systematic study of media, politics, and policies. It assumes that important 
structures and dynamics ‘thicken’ around ‘media systems’ that are bounded by the 
politics of nation-states, without denying the significance of globalization. As the 
rigorous study of the intersection among media, politics and policies demands clear units 
of analysis, and we propose that while the concept of ‘media systems’ is not the only 
relevant analytical unit, it remains important for comparative research interested in 
contrasting cases and assessing the impact of global trends, and alternatives proposed are 
not particularly persuasive. This in turn implies that, as Nitin Govil has argued  ‘the 
national remains a powerful mode for engaging the spatial and temporal practices that 
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organize the contemporary media industries across various economies of scale … [and] 
have created a powerful incentive for media industries to continue to “think nationally” 
even in a globally dispersed field of cultural production’ (Govil 2009: 140). Moreover, 
we argue that this is the case of the ostensibly ‘stateless’ Internet-based media as it is for 
the territorially defined print and broadcasting industries.  
 
‘Media system’ and its alternatives 
Recent work on ‘media systems’ has moved away from normative visions that 
underpinned classic studies about press and media systems. Rather than providing 
arguments about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases, or simply identifying quantitative differences 
between nations, they are interested in identifying central variables that shape the nexus 
between media-politics-policies in order to examine cross-national differences and 
similarities. In particular, Hallin and Mancini’s Comparing Media Systems (2004) 
reinvigorated the concept of ‘media systems’ and showed the importance of taxonomic 
studies for comparative research. While their study captures essential, historical features 
of Western European media systems, it has also generated a significant amount of debate 
and subsequent studies to probe the features of media systems outside Europe (Hallin and 
Mancini 2012).  
 
At the same time, Hallin and Mancini’s comparative framework has emerged in the 
context of technological, political and cultural changes associated with globalization and 
the Internet. The question arises as to whether a comparative model that gives analytical 
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primacy to the nation-state ‘runs the risk of reproducing outdated understandings of 
‘mass’ communication, media ‘systems’ and ‘nation-state’-bound communication flows 
which no longer fit the realities of today’s globalized, multimedia world’ (Pfetsch and 
Esser 2012: 26). The digital revolution has profoundly shaken up the old order by 
multiplying media offerings, further fragmenting media audiences, causing changes in 
news consumption habits, ushering new forms of information sharing (e.g. citizen 
journalism), and facilitating the rise and consolidation of Internet companies. The media 
systems that Hallin and Mancini analyzed may still retain some of its essential historical 
features, but they are significantly more complex than they were in the late 20th century.   
 
The concept of ‘media systems’ can indeed be challenged given that both ideas are far 
from simple. The concept of ‘media’ is changing in the face of technological, industry 
and cultural convergence. In contrast to the 20th century when media technologies, 
institutions, and industries were relatively stable and distinctive, we are now witnessing 
the rapid erosion of distinctions between platforms and the content they carry. These 
developments have not, however, rendered the idea of ‘media’ meaningless, as it still 
refers to technologies used for sharing information and facilitating communication among 
large numbers of people. The digital revolution had added platforms, collapsed past 
distinctions between interpersonal and mass communication, and eroded the dichotomy 
between ‘producers’ and ‘receivers’, but the concept of ‘media’ is itself sufficiently 
flexible to still refer to platforms, institutions and practices that ‘mediate’ information 
and communication processes. 
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The problems with the concept of ‘system’ are of a different order. The concept is 
historically embedded in the functionalist sociology of Talcott Parsons and others that 
was influential up to the 1960s, and subject to a series of withering critiques since that 
time (e.g. Hall 1982). The question is whether ‘system’ is an analytical construct that can 
be applied to the media without carrying the Parsonian baggage about inherent tendencies 
towards social stability or having a single, dominant center. We argue that since the 
concept of ‘system’ alludes to a set of institutions, practices and interactions among 
media industries, technologies, and users that do not presume an underlying value 
consensus or bias towards order or stability as in classic functionalism.  
 
Moreover, proposed alternatives to ‘media system’ do not significantly advance 
understanding of the field, and present their own problems. Yochai Benkler (2006) has 
referred to digital networks as forming a ‘hybrid media ecology’, but it can be argued that 
‘media ecology’, and the related concept of ‘media environments’, are overly determined 
by the biases of specific technologies, as well as assumptions about the 
interconnectedness among constitutive elements derived from biology.   Terms such as 
‘media space’ and ‘media landscape’ may suggest openness as compared to an implied 
closure associated with ‘media system,’ but these are geographical metaphors that lack a 
focus on the role of nation-states within geographical spaces that is a core feature of the 
media systems approach. Other concepts such as ‘media sphere’ and ‘media field’ are 
very much tied to the works of particular authors - Jürgen Habermas and Pierre Bourdieu 
respectively – making it very difficult to use those ideas without importing specific 
theoretical frameworks and normative assumptions. In summary, then, the alternatives 
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proposed to ‘media system’ are neither problem-free nor do they capture the connections 
among media institutions, technologies, and practices. Despite the risk that it may imply 
as functionalist inflection, the concept of ‘media system’ does not assume specific 
dynamics or relations among its elements, set normative horizons, or anchor the analysis 
in particular theoretical views, all of which are benefits in maintaining an open analytical 
framework for comparative media studies.  
 
 
Media systems and nation-states: The question of scale   
The more substantive criticism of the concept of media systems is that it is overly tied to 
a 20th century framework of mass communications, predominantly national media, and 
the dominance of nation-states. As such, it fails to adequately account for the 21st century 
realities of globalization, multicultural societies, and the rise of globally networked 
digital media largely outside the control of national governments. Globalization has 
challenged conventional understandings of ‘national’ media systems by intensifying the 
flows of information and ideas beyond geo-political borders. The political and territorial 
boundaries of nation-states neither cordon off news and information offerings nor 
mediated communication processes, particularly those accessed through the Internet, and 
media users have also become producers and acquired more control over their personal 
media environments. With societies becoming increasingly multicultural, there is also 
greater use of diasporic media, making transnational and transcultural media flows more 
significant, and throwing into question the manner in which nation-states and both 
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supported and regulated national media in order to promote a territorially-defined 
national culture.  
 
The argument that comparative media studies needs to move beyond the national 
‘containers’ of media systems theories towards a global or ‘transcultural’ approach has 
been proposed most strongly by Nick Couldry and Andreas Hepp (2009, 2012). 
Following Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Manuel Castells and others, Couldry and 
Hepp argue that comparative media systems models take the nation-state as the principal 
reference point for comparative research, and that this constitutes a form of ‘territorial 
essentialism’ which loses sight of the extent to which ‘contemporary media cultures are 
not per se bound in such national containers, and so are not necessarily available to be 
compared in this way’ (Couldry and Hepp 2009: 37). It is only by recognizing the limits 
of taking the ‘state territory as a reified starting point’, it is argued, that media cultures 
can be thought of as being transnational, transcultural or deterritorialized, and hence able 
to be thought of ‘outside of a reductive national frame’ (Couldry and Hepp 2012: 257, 
258).  
 
It must be noted that this debate can be become overly polarized. Comparative media 
systems theorists are quite aware of the degree to which media and cultural globalization 
challenge nationally based media systems as a unit for comparative analysis. Hallin and 
Mancini (2004: 76) identified globalization as a force that could promote greater 
homogenization among European media systems, particularly in its association with a 
global media culture where ‘the media are closer to the world of business, and further 
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from the world of politics’. In a similar vein, Voltmer (2012: 231) has asked whether the 
globalization of media markets promotes convergence between media systems. For their 
part, Couldry and Hepp (2009: 39) emphasize that they are not only interested in global 
media phenomena, and that the national space ‘continues to have a high relevance as a 
reference point for constructing national community’. But there is a larger difference here 
that needs close discussion, which is whether the nation-state and national territory retain 
a sufficient degree of primacy in relation to media industries, cultures, markets and flows 
to indicate the continuing analytical value of a media systems approach, or whether this 
represents a form of ‘methodological nationalism’ and allegiance to a ‘traditional place-
bound notion of culture’ (Couldry and Hepp 2009: 44) that has become progressively less 
able to capture the ascendant dynamics of transnational media flows and cultures. 
 
Longstanding assumptions about the nation-state and its ability to effectively regulate and 
manage aspects of national culture are clearly under challenge. Globalization does 
challenge the authority and decision-making capacities of nation-states at several levels, 
ranging from the ways in which hyper-mobile financial capital sets limits to Keynesian 
models of demand management, to the role played by supra-national institutions, laws 
and treaties in making it inevitable that effective political power is now ‘shared and 
bartered by diverse forces and agencies at national, regional and international levels’ 
(Held et al. 1999: 80). Successive waves of large-scale global migration – in many 
instances from the ‘Global South’ to the ‘Global North’ – have seen national population 
become more ethnically heterogeneous and societies become increasingly multicultural, 
challenging traditional conceptions of the role of the nation-state in animating and 
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securing a distinctive national culture. Projects of nation-building that aimed to 
harmonize culture and politics within a single nation-state have had, at best, limited 
results, and the persistence (and growth) of cultural pluralism and the constant dynamics 
of hybridization attest to the limitations of longstanding political ambitions to sculpt 
cultural monoliths (Garcia Canclini 1995). This is particularly apparent in the area of 
media, where diasporic media consumption and transnational media entities typically 
operate outside of the policy purview of national governments, whose regulatory 
frameworks have typically been designed for territorially based national media. The 
degree to which media flows are becoming global and hence ‘stateless’ if of course 
enhanced greatly by the rise of the Internet and social media: seeking to identify the 
‘nationality’ of YouTube videos, and where jurisdictional authority might lie in relation 
to them, is clearly a fraught task (Flew 2012).  
 
A strong case can, however, be made for the continuing centrality of the nation-state to 
media processes, and the significance of the national space in an age of media 
globalization. One of the fallacies of globalization theory is what Ash Amin has 
described as the assumption that it entails ‘a shift in the balance of power between 
different spatial scales’ (Amin 2002: 291), particularly from the national to the global. 
When we think about so-called ‘global’ processes, it is striking how many of these rest 
upon agreements between sovereign nation-states: binding free trade agreements are 
negotiated between national governments, supra-national organizations derive their 
capacity to act from the support of national governments, the most powerful nation-states 
can restrict the scope for action by such supra-national entities, and so on. As Hirst et al. 
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(2009) observed, the metaphor of a ‘scalar shift’ from national to global governance 
ignores the extent to which the nation-state remained central to the ‘suturing’ of relations 
between local, national, and international levels of governance. Even when nation-states 
appear to acquiesce to globalization processes, Linda Weiss (2003) has identified this as 
involving the implementation of policies that actively promote greater international 
economic integration in ways beneficial to local interests. Referring in particular to the 
‘developmental states’ of East Asia, Weiss has argued that these national governments 
were not simply subordinating sovereignty to the dictates of global finance capital or 
supranational agencies; rather, these governments sought to maximize the opportunities 
for companies within their own nations in a more open international trading environment.  
 
For the most part, media corporations are considerably less transnational than those in 
other industries. Using the distinction made by economic geographer Peter Dicken 
between national corporations with international operations (i.e. foreign subsidiaries), and 
global corporations ‘whose geographically-dispersed activities are functionally 
integrated, and not merely a diverse portfolio of activities’ (Dicken 2003: 30), virtually 
all large media corporations – with the possible exception of News Corporation – are in 
the former rather than the latter category (Flew 2007), and no media companies were 
among the world’s 50 most  transnational corporations (UNCTAD 2007).  
 
Further issues could be raised about the continuing salience of the national space and the 
centrality of nation-states to global media processes. While there may be media 
globalization in terms of the free flow of information and entertainment content, there 
  
 
15
remain strong local preferences for locally produced content in most parts of the world 
(Straubhaar 2007). Even where media technologies and formats are explicitly 
transnational, as with satellite and cable TV, considerable adaptation to local and regional 
languages, cultures and expectations concerning program genres has been a condition of 
viability for operating in different countries (Waisbord 2004). This phenomenon has been 
termed cultural discount, or the extent to which a media product is ‘valued to a lesser 
extent by foreign audiences that lack the cultural background and knowledge needed for 
full appreciation of the product’ (Lee 2006: 259).  
 
In terms of production, the rise of global media production networks is often seen as 
subverting national media systems, in two ways. First, these networks are seen to reveal 
an increasingly deterritorialized logic of capitalist production: as Michael Curtin (2009: 
112) has argued ‘capitalism as a social process … shapes the spatial contours of media, 
bearing only a contingent or “not necessary” relation to the nation-state’. Second, they 
point to the centrality of cities, rather than nations, as the decisive ‘switching points’ in 
these global networks, so that one speaks of Bollywood cinema rather than Indian 
cinema, Vancouver as a media production hub rather than as part of the Canadian screen 
industries, or of London as part of the global creative industries network rather than 
distinctly British industries. Such a ‘reconfiguration of national space in transnational 
terms’ (Punathambekar 2013: 3) aligns with a broader literature on the rise of ‘global 
cities’ in an age of economic and cultural globalization, where ‘cities, as compared with 
nation-states, appear to be interacting more dynamically, even proactively, with the 
challenges and opportunities of globalization’ (Isar et al. 2012: 3).  
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While such work has generated important insights, it does not necessarily negate the 
continuing centrality of national media systems. The politics of cities and regions remains 
largely embedded within national politics, and the number of genuinely ‘breakaway’ 
movements worldwide remains relatively limited, even if the politics of uneven 
development generates internal political tensions. Moreover, global media production 
networks continue to rely upon a range of enabling support structures provided by nation 
states that range from communications infrastructure and tax incentives to labor laws and 
the policing of copyright. They are not ‘stateless’ modes of production, and this is 
particularly apparent when movements of creative labor are considered: the ‘trajectories 
of creative migration’ that Curtin discusses (2009: 113-15) hinge upon national laws 
governing the movement of persons across national borders that are not necessarily 
becoming more relaxed, and are in many parts of the world becoming more stringent. 
Finally, as suggested above, the extent to which media and cultural consumption has 
become cosmopolitan and deracinated is often overstated, and global networks of media 
production and distribution such as Bollywood remain strongly reliant upon the – 
admittedly large and growing - diasporic communities with ties to the home country.  
 
The ‘global turn’ in media studies has correctly drawn attention to the need for an 
epistemology that properly recognizes transformations that challenge neat distinctions 
between local/national/transnational. We argue that it does not, however, properly 
recognize the continuous importance of domestic politics and the power pull of the 
nation-state, and we still need fine-grained approaches that examine the influence of local 
  
 
17
and national politics on media systems.1 Such approaches direct our attention to old yet 
relevant issues in social theory, namely, the architecture and autonomy of state politics 
and the scope of collective action to transform policies. These issues remain important to 
examine the power of transnational actors and globally connected citizens in media 
policies. We should continue to try to understand how particular political contexts and 
forms of state interventionism affect structures and dynamics of media systems. Just as 
the type of political regimes has obviously different impact on media performance 
(Voltmer 2012), a host of political issues also need to be considered to understand the 
overall characteristics of media systems: the types of democratic state, the institutional 
architecture of democracies, how political systems channel demands and public 
expression, elitist and democratic forms of media policy-making, and collective 
mobilization around media policies and content. These issues need to be at the forefront 
of the research agenda of comparative studies to produce nuanced understandings about 
the articulation between media and politics.  
 
Media systems and the analysis of global phenomena: the case of 
Internet policies 
What are ‘media systems’ good for in comparative media studies? ‘Media systems’ may 
not be explanatory variables to account for similarities and differences in media politics 
and media policies, but they remain central analytical units to understand various global 
phenomena. Media systems as a whole do not explain global phenomena, as their 
existence transcends the national space by definition, and it may be the case that, as 
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Humphreys (2011) has observed, specific variables may offer more parsimonious 
explanations to understand similarities and differences among countries than ‘media 
systems’ in their totality. But the underlying architecture of media systems analysis 
remains central to assessing the impact of global media developments in particular 
contexts, and the impact of globalization (capital, technology, policies, media flows and 
content) on media systems cannot be properly understood without addressing how states 
and domestic media politics function (Nielsen 2013).  
 
A good area of research to assess the value of ‘media systems’ in the study of 
globalization is the role of states in Internet policies, precisely because the Internet has 
been conventionally viewed as the epitome of the libertarian dream of borderless 
cyberspace that renders state sovereignty and control obsolete. Ongoing debates about 
internet neutrality, freedom, and privacy, however, attest to efforts in a different direction 
– namely, the intention to ‘nationalize’ cyberspace and build a parochial, fragmented 
Internet anchored by national laws. From ‘national security’ concerns to corporate 
espionage, states have appealed to various arguments to justify controls that essentially 
contradict the libertarian aspiration for a global, stateless network. Three national cases, 
China, Australia and Brazil, offer evidence of this trend, showing that states retain power 
to shape the legal boundaries of ‘media systems’ not only in legacy media industries such 
as broadcasting, but also on the Internet.  
 
Even the most ardent advocates of the proposition that the Internet is a force for 
globalization would acknowledge that China presents a complicating case. Early in the 
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2000s, Boas and Kalathil (2003) identified China as being a counterpoint to the 
conventional wisdom that the Internet was a democratizing force that would challenge 
one-party rule, observing at the time that the Chinese government was promoting local 
forms of Internet development that would ‘serve state-defined interests rather than 
challenging them’ (Boas and Kalathil 2003: 3). A decade later, Evgeny Morozov (2012) 
would discuss the Chinese case as establishing how the Internet could enable greater state 
surveillance of citizens, due to the ‘traces’ left by online communication, challenging 
what he referred to as ‘the Net delusion’ of social media as a democratizing force. As 
China is now by far the world’s largest Internet-using nation, with over 500 million 
people online – more than double the number of the second largest Internet-using nation, 
the United States – there is clearly a need to rethink assumptions about the Internet as a 
force for global liberal democracy (Bolsover et al. 2013). The recurring difficulties that 
Google has faced operating in China are also indicative of the very different nature of the 
relationship between state agencies and corporations that prevails in the Chinese context 
as compared to the United States.  
 
It can be argued, however, that the distinctive features of the Internet in China, that 
challenge conceptions of it as a globalizing force that is disruptive of national media 
systems, extend well beyond the impact of the Communist Party’s one-party rule and the 
use of media to promote its political leadership. Companies such as Tencent, Alibaba and 
Baidu have come to dominate the Chinese Internet market even when they have faced 
strong competition from Google, Microsoft, Paypal, Yahoo! and others, as they have 
been consistently more responsive to specific developments in Internet use in China, in 
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ways that are far more difficult for a Chinese subsidiary of a Western company to 
achieve. The Oxford Internet Institute survey of worldwide Internet use found that 
Chinese Internet users were more than twice as likely as U.S. users to make online 
purchases (59% compared to 23%) and watch videos (85% to 39%), and three times as 
likely to download music online (80% compared to 19%) (Bolsover et al. 2013: 12). The 
differences they reported for the use of mobile phone (mobile Internet) to make 
purchases, watch videos and download music in China as compared to the United States 
were even starker. In a nation where political connections are paramount to success as a 
media-related business (Huang 2012), the proximity of Chinese Internet companies to the 
Chinese state, and their ability to respond quickly to fast-changing government edicts 
concerning online information access and use is obviously advantageous, but so too is 
their grounding in the culture of a nation where the take-up of online services is moving 
very quickly. The point to be made is that the rapid take-up of the Internet in China is not 
diminishing the degree to which we can identify a distinctive Chinese national media 
system.  
 
In contrast to the Chinese media system, which remains largely national even after almost 
forty years of opening up to globalization, the Australian media system has always been 
highly open to international influences. About 40 per cent of television viewed in 
Australia is produced overseas – with at least 90 per cent of imported content from the 
United States – and locally produced films only account for about 4-5 percent of 
Australian box office receipts (Screen Australia 2013). In relation to the Internet, the 
scope for Australian government agencies to regulate online flows is minimal, although 
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this has not stopped governments from proposing that they do so. Under schedules 5 and 
7 of the Broadcasting Services (Online Services) Amendment 1999, the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) can require Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) to block access to content that could be considered to be ‘prohibited content’ or 
‘potentially prohibited content’ under Australian classification laws, and in some 
instances can act on content that is rated R18+ (i.e. only suitable for adults) where that 
content is not subject to some form of ‘restricted access system’, such as some form of 
age verification as a condition of accessing the content (ALRC 2012: 52-53). As almost 
all higher-level online content is produced and distributed from outside of Australia, such 
provisions have been widely criticized as being largely ineffectual yet at the same time 
infringing the civil liberties of Australians (Coroneos 2008; Crawford and Lumby 2011). 
 
 
The latter criticisms intensified when the Australian Government announced in late 2009 
that it intended to introduce legislative amendments to the Broadcasting Services Act to 
require all ISPs in Australia to filter or ‘block’ all content that would be Refused 
Classification (RC) under Australian laws hosted on overseas servers. While the 
mandatory Internet filtering proposal was ultimately abandoned, the extended discussion 
surrounding its introduction was a reminder of how ‘it had become well established that 
nation states had both the right to regulate, and an interest in regulating, the Internet … as 
the Internet ceased to be the plaything of only academics, researchers and geeks, and 
became part of daily social and family life’ (Edwards 2009: 626).  
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In the Convergence Review (Convergence Review Committee 2012), and in other 
reviews such as the National Classification Scheme Review (ALRC 2012), the 
benchmark for whether regulations related to ownership, content and standards should 
apply was identified as a mix of ability to attract a significant local audience, deriving 
significant revenues from Australian activities, and distributing professionally-produced 
content aimed at Australian audiences. What the Convergence Review termed Content 
Service Enterprises met this definition, and while their criteria only included Australian 
media companies in the report, it was flagged that companies such as Google and Apple 
could be subject to such regulations were their Australian operations to expand 
sufficiently (Convergence Review Committee 2012: 10-13).  
 
Brazil is another interesting case showing the persistence of state policies in shaping the 
contours and functioning of the Internet. President Dilma Rousseff delivered a blistering 
speech before the United Nations General Assembly in October 2013 in which she 
accused the United States of spying and being responsible for ‘a breach of international 
law’ and ‘an affront’ to Brazil’s independence. The speech came in the aftermath of 
former US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden’s revelations about US government 
spying on its Brazilian counterpart and oil giant Petrobras and Canadian interests 
monitoring Internet information related to Brazil’s mining industry.  
 
Right after the information became public, the government threw its support behind a 
congressional bill on Internet governance that had been championed by freedom of 
expression and data privacy advocates. President Rousseff urged Congress to fast-track 
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the bill in 90 days. The bill was introduced in August 2013 and was drafted on the basis 
of the Marco Civil Regulatorio da Internet (Internet Civilian Regulatory Framework), a 
declaration developed by civil society after years of consultation and debates. It is based 
on the Marco’s five points: (1) freedom of expression, privacy of the individual and 
respect for human rights; (2) open, multilateral and democratic governance, carried out 
with transparency, by stimulating collective creativity, and the participation of society, 
Governments, and the private sector; (3) universality that ensures the social and human 
development and the construction of inclusive and non-discriminatory societies; (4) 
cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs, customs and values; and (5) 
neutrality of the network, guided only by technical and ethical criteria, rendering it 
inadmissible to restrict it for political, commercial, religious or any other purpose. The 
framework was originally developed by a partnership between the Ministry of Justice and 
a prestigious think tank, and was finalized through a participatory process that involved a 
range of civic, public, and private actors.  
 
The government’s sudden push for the initiative reflected a turning point in its position 
vis-à-vis Internet policies. The government had previously tolerated actions by public 
officials to censor content as well as legal actions, including the arrest of a Google 
executive for refusing to take down a video that was critical of mayoral candidate. 
Suddenly, the government showed interest in ensuring a ‘Brazilian’ internet and 
protecting ‘Brazilian’ data, in President Dilma Rousseff’s words, and reaffirmed its 
intention to become a global leader on this matter together with other BRIC countries. 
Freedom of expression and Internet neutrality groups have applauded Rousseff’s critique 
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of digital surveillance, but raised questions about the problems for free flow of 
information if data localization requirements become effective.  It is too soon to draw 
conclusions about the impact of Brazil’s newfound ‘nationalism’ in Internet policies, yet 
the government’s actions and words attest to the possibility that states remain committed 
to a ‘national’ Internet that reflects specific principles. This decision builds on its long-
standing interest in strengthening a ‘Brazilian’ internet infrastructure by increasing 
domestic bandwidth, content production, and network equipment., as well as being 
grounded in traditional arguments about the need to defend ‘national sovereignty’ vis-à-
vis foreign governments and corporations through state-supported policies.  
 
Conclusion 
The persistent analytical value of ‘media systems’ suggests that adopting ‘methodological 
statism’, to use Ulrich Beck’s expression, seems warranted in comparative studies of 
media politics and policies. As long as critical interactions among media institutions, 
technologies and practices are ‘sutured’ or thicken in state-bounded media systems, it 
would be mistaken to discount their significance or consider them analytical relics. 
Domestic actors continue to largely shape the dynamics of media politics, and the ability 
of nation-states to control key aspects of media governance remains central to how media 
businesses operate. The concept of ‘media systems’ retains analytical value to study 
structures and dynamics both within the political confines of the states and globally. It is 
incorrect to discard this concept based on its presumed irrelevance amidst media 
globalization. 
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We should move past the debate between ‘the global’ or ‘the state’ in media studies in 
order to better understand the interaction among competing forces. Just as certain 
media/social/cultural processes cannot be examined if the analysis remains focused on 
states, other issues that are central to media systems need to be considered by studying 
state institutions and dynamics. There is no inevitable, straightforward shift from the 
local and the national to the global, particularly in relation to legacy media industries and 
content. Nor does it seem that the Internet represents a uniform shift towards 
globalization as demonstrated by patterns of use and governance. A global mediated 
sphere is neither the only possibility nor an unstoppable development that overshadows, 
let alone surpasses, local and national media processes. This is why it is important to go 
beyond framing the debate in terms of ‘the passing’ or ‘the persistence’ of the state, and 
instead, understand how local, national and global forces shape media politics and 
policies.  
 
To capture this dynamics and encourage comparative studies, ‘media system’ remains 
better than other concepts, precisely because it condenses multiple dynamics at work and 
directs attention to forces and institutions that continue to agglutinate media politics, 
policies, content, and uses. Media systems are points of convergence of political, 
economic, social, and cultural forces grounded in the local, the national, and the global. 
They should be seen neither as self-contained entities nor as extensions or epiphenomena 
of global developments. Instead, we should think of ‘media systems’ as analytical units to 
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understand how and where multiple dynamics intersect as well as the comparative weight 
of actors and institutions in shaping the media.  
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1 Chakravartty and Roy (2013) have proposed an alternative model of media systems 
potentially more applicable to the democracies of the Global South. Drawing upon he 
India case, they identify four key factors insufficiently analyzed in the Hallin and 
Mancini model: the importance of informal, non-institutional politics; the unit of analysis 
being sub-national regions rather than the nation-state as a whole; the extent to which 
emergent media entrepreneurs can themselves shape new political movements; and the 
coexistence of ‘partisan’ media systems, where media outlets align with conventional 
political parties, and ‘network’ media systems’, where ‘“generative models” of the media 
as an active shaper of political power’ are becoming the norm’ (Chakravartty and Roy 
2013: 365). These important tendencies can be found in a number of countries; one can 
think, for example, of how Forza Italia emerged as a political outgrowth of Silvio 
Berlusconi’s media empire. At the same time, Chakravartty and Roy’s approach remains 
a ‘national’ one, in that it gives primacy to Indian actors in shaping the nation’s media-
politics relationships, and would thus be consistent with the propositions presented here.  
